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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

MA VOR JEAN CARNES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
Case No. 18, 370
CLIFF CARNES,
Defendant-Appellant.
---0000000- - -

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action based upon a Florida judgment for delinquent
alimony.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

On September 15, 1981, the district court, the Honorable G.
Hal Taylor presiding, entered an order that, upon the filing by
plaintiff of proof of service in the Florida action judgment would be
entered against the defendant.

That proof was filed with the district

court on January 22, 1982, and, after two further hearings, the district
court, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding, entered judgment against
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defendant.
1982.

The defendant appealed only from the judgment of March 5,

Thereafter, on April 29, 1982, the district court, the Honorable

David B. Dee again presiding, entered its Order making the entire Decree
of the Florida court the decree of the district court.

No appeal has

been taken from that ruling.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent Mavor Jean Carnes respectfully requests that this
Court affirm in all respects the judgment entered against appellant
Cliff Carnes by the district court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter

"~.1rs.

Carnes") deems it

necessary to present a statement of the facts of this case since the
statement presented by defendant-appellant (hereinafter "Mr. Carnes")
fails to reflect accurately all of the relevent facts and procedural
history of this case.
Based upon a complaint for divorce filed by Mr. Carnes in the
Circuit Court for Brevard County, Florida, a Decree of Divorce was
entered by the Florida court on July 28, 1978.

(R. at 7-8.)

That

Decree provided inter alia that Mr. Carnes was to pay alimony of $60 per
week and that the Florida court retained jurisdiction of both "the cause
and the parties" and that service of any further proceedings could be by
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mail.

(Id.)

Mr. Carnes never made a single payment to Mrs.

Carnes and

she, acting through Florida counsel, filed a motion for an arrearage
judgment in the Florida proceedings.

(R. at 28.)

Notice of the motion

for an arrearage judgment was served upon Mr. Carnes by the Salt Lake
County sheriff's department on October 22, 1980.
32-34.)

(R. at 26-27 and

The Florida court entered an arrearage judgment against

Mr. Carnes on November 10, 1980, in the amount of $5,640.05, noting that
he had paid none of the alimony directed by the court.

(R. at 9.)

On April 28, 1981, Mrs. Carnes filed a complaint with the
District Court in $alt Lake County, seeking enforcement of the Florida
arrearage judgment on "full faith and credit" grounds and seeking to
have the on-going alimony provisions of the original Florida Decree
recognized by the Utah District Court for enforcement purposes.
2-12.)

Mr. Carnes filed an Answer raising two basic defenses:

(R. at
first,

that he was entitled to a claimed off-set against Mrs. Carnes and,
second, that the Florida alimony law was unconstitutional and the
Florida court, therefore, had no personal jurisdiction.

( R. at 15-16. )

On August 26, 1981, r.lrs. Carnes filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(R. at 17-18.)

Signlficantly,

~.1r.

Carnes filed nothing in

opposition to that motion, which was heard before the late Honorable G.
Hal Taylor on September 4, 1981.

Judge Taylor ruled that the claimed

off-set and alleged unconstitutionality of Florida's alimony statutes
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were insufficient to constitute a defense, noted that Mr. Carnes had
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Florida court, and entered
his order that upon the filing by Mrs. Carnes of a Proof of Service of
her Florida motion for an arrearage judgment, she would be granted
judgment in the amount of $5, 640. 05.

(R. at 21-22.)

Mr. Carnes neither

filed nor preserved an appeal from that Order.
On January 22, 1982, Mrs. Carnes filed with the Court a
certified and exemplified copy of a duplicate Affidavit of out-of-state
service signed by Salt Lake County sheriff's deputy Grant Peterson,
attesting to the service of the notice and motion of the Florida
arrearage proceedings upon

~11r.

Carnes.

(R. at 25-26.)

Mrs. Carnes also

filed a motion for judgnent based upon that proof of service and Judge
Taylor's earlier ruling.

(R. at 23-24.)

In opposition to that motion,

Mr. Carnes filed nothing.
Thereafter, on February 16, 1982, an Affidavit of Grant
Peterson was filed, also attesting to the service upon Mr. Carnes.

That·

Affidavit differed from the Proof of Service only in the location at
which the service was stated to have taken place.

Both the Affidavit

and the Proof of Service attested to personal service.

Another

he~ring

was held before the District Court, the Honorable David B. Dee
presiding, on February 19, 1982.
matter under advisement.

At that time, Judge Dee took the

( R. at 3 5.)
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It was not until February 26, 1982, some six months after

Mrs. Carnes first moved for the entry of judgment based upon the Florida
arrearage judgment, that Mr. Carnes filed any Affidavit with the court
in opposition.

In that Affidavit, he claims that on the date Deputy

Peterson served the Notice of the Florida arrearage proceeding,
l\1r. Carnes did not reside at the address stated by Deputy Peterson in
his Proof of Service.

Mr. Carnes also makes the conclusory statement

that he was "never served at any time".

(R. at 46.)

Significantly, he

does not state any of the facts upon which that conclusion could have
been based (e.g., no papers were ever left with him, he never spoke with
a sheriff's deputy).
Mrs. Canes having fully complied with Judge Taylor's Order of
September 15, 1981 (that Proof of Service upon

~,1r.

Carnes in the Florida

arrearage proceeding be filed), Judge Dee entered judgment against
Hr. Carnes on March 5, 1982.

(R. at 59.)

The Affidavit of

~.1r.

Carnes

having been filed six months late, Judge Dee acted well within his
discretion and was bound to follow Judge Taylor's unconditional Order
that, upon the filing of a Proof of Service, judgment would be entered
in favor of Mrs. Carnes.
Thereafter, on April 16, 1982, Mrs. Carnes filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings with respect to the recognition by the Utah
court of the Florida Decree's on-going alimony provisions.

(R. at 110.)

Although Mr. Carnes filed an "objection" to that motion (R. at 114), he

5
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again failed to file any Affidavit in opposition to the motion.

The

only ground raised in the "objection" was that the district court lacked
jurisdiction due to this appeal.

On April 29, 1982, Judge Dee entered

an Order granting full faith and credit to the on-going alimony
provisions of the Florida Decree.

(R. at 118.)

No appeal has been

taken from that Order.
It is to be noted that nowhere and at no time has Mr. Carnes

ever disputed that he has failed to pay any of the alimony ordered by
the Florida court.

He has never denied that Mrs. Carnes is entitled to

judgment, he has merely quibbled over procedural technicalities.

Since

the district court has now recognized the underlying Florida Decree,
with its on-going alimony provisions, the present appeal is, in a very
real sense, moot.

!.1r. Carnes is presently earning approximately $2, 700

per month (R. at 132, 134, and 136); in equity and good conscience he
should not be permitted to avoid the alimony obligation decreed by the
Florida court upon the basis of moot technicalities.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MR. CARNES WAS

UNTIMELY AND DOES NOT RAISE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT.

The Order entered on September 15, 1981, by the late Honorable
G. Hal Taylor was based upon a motion filed by l\1rs. Carnes on August 26,
1981.

r.1r. Carnes filed no Affidavit, or indeed any other materials, in
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opposition to that motion until he filed his own Affidavit six months
later on February 26, 1982.

Had he wished to challenge the service of

process in connection with the Florida arrearage proceedings, his
Affidavit could just as easily have been filed in August of 1981.

The

Affidavit upon which Mr. Carnes relies was filed six months too late.
The district court was entirely justified in entering judgment
irrespective of it.
In addition to the statement in his Affidavit that he had not
resided at the address given by Deputy Peterson in his Proof of Service,
Mr. Carnes offers the conclusion of law that he "was not served at any
time".

(R. at 46.)

Even if timely filed, this conclusory generaliza-

tion could not have provided the basis for a "question of fact" upon
which the motion for summary judgment could have been denied by the
District Court.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

mandates that any Affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment state facts on the basis of personal knowledge:
Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. • • .
Rule 56(e), U. R. C .P.

Whether or not "service" of a legal document has

occurred is a question of law to be determined on the basis of the
underlying facts.
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This Court affirmed a motion for summary judgment granted by
the trial court notwithstanding the defendant's affidavit containing
numerous conclusions and opinions without supporting facts in Walker v.
Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538
(1973).

This Court noted and rejected the defendant's contention that

its conclusory affidavit had created questions of fact precluding
summary judgment, holding:
Defendant • • • asserts that there
were material, disputed issues of fact
which precluded the trial court from
granting summary judgment. The opposing
affidavit submitted by defendant did not
comport with the requirements of Rule
56(e), U.R.C.P., i.e. such an affidavit
must be made on personal knowledge of the
affiant, and set forth facts which would
be admissible in evidence and show that
the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein.
. . .
Hearsay and opinion testimony that would
not be admissible if testified to at
trial may not properly be set for th in an
affidavit.
A review of defendant's opposing
affidavit reveals no evidentiary facts
but
merely
reflects
the
affiant's
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions
in regard to the transactions.
508 P. 2d at 542 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).

In the present

action, the Affidavit of Mr. Carnes fails to state a single fact in
support of his conclusion that he was "never served at any time".
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Moreover, the only factual allegations of the Affidavit relate
to the issue of where deputy Grant Peterson actually served

~.1r.

Carnes.

It is not material to valid service where Mr. Carnes was served since
the service was effected upon him personally.

This Court has frequently

recognized the fundamental principle that only a genuine dispute as to a
material fact will justify the denial of a motion for summary judgment.
For example, in Heglar Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah
1980), the district court granted summary judgment notwithstanding that

a vigorous factual dispute existed as to a r.latter which, even if
resolved in favor of the persons against whom the summary judgment was
entered, would not have constituted a valid defense.

In affirming the

summary judgment entered by the trial court, this Court noted:
Summary judgment is appropriate if
the pleadings and all other submissions
show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
The foregoing rule does not preclude
summary judgment simply whenever soCTe
fact remains in dispute, but only when a
material fact is genuinely controverted.
619 P.2d at 1391 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).

In the present

case, whether Mr. Carnes was served at his home, at his work, or
anywhere else within the state of Utah, is absolutely irrelevant.

If he

was personally served at all, the Florida judgment is valid and is
entitled to the full faith and credit of the district court.

Therefore,
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the district court was entirely correct in entering judgment notwithstanding any dispute which may have existed with respect to where
~11r.

Carnes had been served in connection with the Florida action.
Similarly, in FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc.,

17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), this Court affirmed the granting of

summary judgment notwithstanding the existence of a vigorous dispute as
to matters which, even if they had been resolved in favor of the losing
party, would not have precluded judgment.

In that case, as in the

present action, the defendant attempted to assert in defense of a motion
for judgment matters not raised in the Answer.

The court held that even

tl the Answer were deemed amended, and even tl the defendant prevailed
on the factual disputes, the plaintiff would still have been entitled to
summary judgment, noting:
[Tl he dispute as to whether the defendant
did or did not receive statements from
the Cook Realty is not of critical
concern.
This is the answer to
defendant's contention that the summary
judgment should not have been granted
because of the disagreement about that
fact. Mere dispute as· to some question
of fact does not preclude the granting of
summary judgment. The issue in dispute
must be one which is material in the
sense that resolving it is necessary to
determine
the legal
rights
of
the
parties.
404 P. 2d at 673 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

In its decision,
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this Court also noted the fact that, wisely used, summary judgments play
a vital and important role:
The trial court concluded that in spite
of anything contended for by the
defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
The
granting of the summary judgment under
those circumstances had the salutary
effect of saving time, effort and expense
which would have been involved in having
a trial, which could have served no
useful purpose.
Id. at 671 (footnote omitted).

This observation is equally applicable

to the facts of the present case.
Similarly, in Allen's Products Company v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d
9, 414 P. 2d 93 ( 1966), this Court held that the district court
not only can but should grant a motion
for summary judgment if he feels certain
that he would rule that way no matter
what proof a party could produce in
support of his contentions.
414 P. 2d at 94.

And in Pioneer Savings and Loan Association v. Pioneer

Finance and Thrift Company, 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 (1966), this
Court emphasized that summary judgment
must be
if there
.material
entitled
•

•

•

granted and upheld by this court
is no genuine issue as to any
fact and the moving party is
to judgment as a matter of law

•

417 P.2d at 123.
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POINT- -Il.

ANY DEFECTS IN THE SERVICE UPON

MR. CARNES, OR IN ITS RETURN, WERE INSUBSTANTIAL AND
NOT SUFFICIENT TO PRECLUDE THE JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE
DISTRICT COURT.

The only substantial, timely-raised issue relates to the
difference in the location of the service upon 1\1r. Carnes stated by
Deputy Peterson in his Proof of Service as opposed to his Affidavit.
Under the decisions of this Court, that difference is not deemed
sufficient to constitute a valid ground to refuse entry of judgment.
In Redwood Land Company

v.

Kimball, 20 Utah 2d 113, 433 P. 2d

1010 (1967), the defendant sought to quash service of the summons
because proof of service was not provided within the prescribed five-day
period of time.

In affirming the trial court's denial of this motion,

this Supreme Court stated:
We are in accord with the view adopted by
the trial court in denying the motion;
that the defect she complains of is not
jurisdictional.
It is with respect to
the correctness of the summons itself,
and the due service thereof,
which
notifies the defendant that he is being
sued, and by which jurisdiction over him
is acquired, that there must be strict
compliance.
[Citations omitted.] However, proof of the fact that such service
has been made, also ref erred to as the
return of the summons, is something of a
different character. Its only purpose is
to supply the information to the court,
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the interested parties and their atorneys
that the defendant has been so served.
•

• •

When the procedure described for the
acquisition
of
jurisdiction
of
the
defendant has been properly carried out,
that is where there has been a correct
service of a proper summons, a mistake or
irregularity of the kind here shown in
the proof of service does not destroy the
validity
of
the
service
itself.
433 P.2d at 1010-1011.
The same rule is followed in Florida.

For example, in

Klosenski v. Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1959), the court held that
an officer's return of service is no part of the service but merely
evidence to enable the trial judge to determine whether jurisdiction
over the defendant has been acquired.

An irregularity in the proof of

service as demonstrated by the Affidavit filed by Mr. Carnes is not
jurisdictional.
This sound rule was also applied in Brand-t v. Daman Trailer
Sales, Inc., 116 Ariz. 421, 569 P.2d 851 (1977), in which it was held

,

that defects in a return of service do not deprive the court of
jurisdiction, which is acquired by the service itself.
AdditionB.lly, Section 17-22-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), provides:
The return of the sheriff upon process or
notice is prim a f acie evidence of the
facts in such return stated.
§17-22-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended.) In the face of this
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prima facie evidence of personal service upon him,

~.1r.

Carnes only

demonstrated technical defects in the Proof of Service.

He submitted no

timely Affidavit and even his Affidavit filed six months after the
motion contained no factual statements to support his conclusion that he
"was never served".

Thus, Mr. Carnes never successfully refuted the

presumption of service.
That a defective or inconsistent return of service of process
is not a jurisdictional defect is further established by Rule 4(h) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
At any time in its discretion and upon
such terms as it deems just, the court
may allow any process or proof of service
thereof to be amended, unless it clearly
appears that material prejudice would
result to the substantial rights of the
party against whom the service is issued.
Rule 4(h), U.R.C.P.

Permitting an amendment of the Proof of Service

supplied by Deputy Peterson did not prejudice ?l1r. Carnes, for the place
of service does not change the fact of personal service.

In Federal

Land Bank of Berkley v. Brenton, 106 Utah 149, 146 P.2d 200 (1944), the
Utah Supreme Court held:
The fact that service has been made, by
the weight of authority, may be proved or
a defective proof of service may be
amended after judgment. It is held that
it is the fact of service that gives
jurisdiction, not the proof of it.
146 P. 2d at 201 (emphasis added).

Where process has been properly
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served, a technical defect in the paperwork that can be readily
corrected to speak the truth should not be allowed to interfere with
substantial justice.

The District Court's decision to enter judgment

based upon unpaid alimony that Mr. Carnes never denied should be
affirmed.

CONCLUSION

Mrs. Carnes complied fully with the Order of the late
Judge Taylor, providing a certified and exemplified copy of Proof of
Service in the Florida arrearage proceedings.

She also went beyond the

requirements of Judge Taylor's order and provided an Affidavit of Deputy
Peterson, again establishing personal service.
Some six months after the filing of the motion for judgment
against him, Mr. Carnes filed a conclusory Affidavit, claiming that he
was "never served" but utterly failing to state any factual allegations
upon which that conclusion could be based.

Moreover, he has never, to

this day, presented any evidence or argument that the alimony arrearage
upon which the present judgment is based is not, in fact, due.

He now

earns approximately $2, 700 per month and should not be permitted to
benefit from procedural technicalities or delay which he has created.
In view of the fact that the District Court has now recognized
the on-going alimony provisions of the Florida Decree and r.1r. Carnes has
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filed no appeal from that Order, his argument that the judgment entered
against him should be reversed is, in a very real and practical sense.
absolutely moot.

The judgment entered against appellant Cliff Carnes

should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/day of July, 1982.
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I certify that on this -'.' ~ 1 day of July, 1982, I mailed with
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postage prepaid two copies of the foregoing Brief to Edward K. Brass,
attorney for Appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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